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This morning my news feed was full of posts by friends and colleagues about Obama’s announcement yesterday that the United States has sent 100 US troops to Uganda to eliminate the LRA threat. According to a US State Department press statement, the troops were there to “work with our regional partners and the African Union in the field to strengthen information-sharing, enhance coordination and planning, and improve the overall effectiveness of military operations and the protection of civilians” (http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/10/175522.htm). I’ve decided to quote from this statement directly because there have been discrepancies in the media on whether or not these troops will be “combat equipped” and what their role are advisers will really entail.

Since the early drafts of the LRA Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009 (the US act which calls for the US to support efforts to stop the LRA), I have been in support of its good intentions- to put the plight of those in LRA-affected areas on the radar and to see an end to the conflict- but I’ve remained passionately against its methods to do so- largely through the support of heavy-handed military interventions.

According to the State Department, the LRA Act “includes efforts to help increase the protection of civilians, encourage and facilitate defections of lower-level LRA fighters, and provide continued humanitarian relief.” This sounds great on paper, but how much has the US intervention so far really invested in any of those efforts? Well, according to the press statement, “Since 2008, the United States has provided over $40 million in critical logistical support, equipment and training to enhance counter-LRA operations by regional militaries.” I see no mention of civilian protection, defections of LRA, or humanitarian relief there. Do you?

From the beginning, those of us who were critical of the strategy predicted this would be the case- that it would primarily focus on a military intervention at the expense of the humanitarian or redevelopment components of the act. It has been well-documented that these military interventions cause brutal retaliation on civilians by LRA forces, something the act supposedly hopes to reduce. Time will only tell whether the alluded upcoming military campaign will be any different. For those civilians in its path, I sincerely hope it will be.

Since the dissolution of the Juba peace process and the relocation of LRA to neighboring countries, the number of defections has been extremely low for a variety of reasons of which I don’t expect to exhaust here. However, the hostility of civilians and military forces (the very ones the US troops are supporting) means that those who escape the LRA, especially those who are from Uganda, face sexual assault and even brutal death at the hands of these actors. More so, developments in Uganda’s transitional justice framework, though welcomed, have raised many questions on the validity of amnesty and have not provided many incentives for LRA to defect.The ongoing trial of ex-LRA commander Thomas Kwoyelo is one such example. A military campaign will further entrench the idea that it is not safe to leave LRA.

One must bear in mind that LRA factions are still primarily comprised of abducted persons. While some of them have risen in rank and now hold leadership positions, most of those who are there did not join the rebels at their own will but are forced to stay. Any military intervention, especially those led by regional forces, cannot avoid casualties of abducted persons. In my work in Uganda, I engage with many categories of victims. I would like to tell you two stories that will make their dilemmas more real and put a life to the innocent people who will be targeted through such military efforts.

First is a woman named Norah. Her son Nevil was abducted while on a bus traveling to his home so he could pick supplies to join the university in Kampala. Norah is of a group referred to as ‘parents of the missing.’ She has hope that her son is still alive and wants nothing more for him to be able to return home to Uganda. Such a military campaign greatly diminishes the probability that Nevil will survive to come back.

Second is a woman named Hope*. Hope was abducted when she was in secondary school and she spent nearly 10 years in captivity. When the government forces launched Operation Iron Fist in 2002 (a military campaign that pledged to eliminate the LRA threat), Hope was forced to be on the run with the LRA. Her story is one of incredible survival. When the LRA would run into ambushes laid by government soldiers or be detected by government aircraft carrying bombs, the government forces fired indiscriminately on LRA. They did not care whether they were shooting a culpable LRA commander or an innocent abducted child. Hope barely survived these attacks, and dodged bullets and bombs unarmed while carrying her infant daughter on her back. This is the reality of how these military missions play out in real life. I don’t think that any level of intelligence that US can provide will change this nature of blind confrontation. Worth noting, Hope also recounts during these times how the government soldiers would leave trails of condom wrappers in their wake. In the heat of battle, in close pursuit of LRA, UPDF soldiers hoped to sexually assault any female LRA combatants they could find. This is the character of regional forces that the US military is collaborating with.

It should come as no surprise then that most people I have talked to in northern Uganda are less than enthusiastic about more military interventions, whether they are US-backed or not. This is also why I am distraught by the enthusiasm of some of my peers in the United States. The US public would never condone a mission of US troops that posed such a high risk to hostages should they be US citizens. Why should we condone missions that endanger the lives of innocent Ugandans, Congolese, Sudanese, etc.? It’s irresponsible. I also am disturbed that the State Department press statement makes no mention of protection for those in LRA captivity. Instead, it alleges to focus on civilian protection. It’s as if those already in LRA are lost causes.

In closing, it’s not too late to reopen the doors of communication between the LRA and regional governments. While I agree wholeheartedly that the LRA must stop committing atrocities, a militarized attempt to stop them has proven ineffective for more than 20 years, and I have little hope to think that this time will be different. More so, stopping them at the expense of the life of civilians and those in captivity is unjust. You cannot fight violence with violence, and the end does not justify the means.

* Name changed to protect her identity.